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Abstract 
The success of the London 2012 Paralympic not only revealed new public possibilities for 
the disabled, but also thrust the debates on the relationship between elite Paralympians and 
advanced prosthetic technology into the spotlight. One of the Paralympic stars, Oscar 
Pistorius, in particular became celebrated as ‘the Paralympian cyborg’. Also prominent has 
been Aimee Mullins, a former Paralympian, who become a globally successful fashion 
model by seeking to establish a new bodily aesthetic utilizing non-organic body parts. This 
paper examines how the modern discourse of prosthesis has shifted from the made-up and 
camouflaged body to the empowered and exhibited body to create a new cultural sensitivity 
of body image – prosthetic aesthetics. Prosthetic aesthetics oscillates between two 
polarized sensitivities: attractiveness/’coolness’, which derive from the image of a perfect 
human-machine synthetic body, and abjection/uncanny which is evoked by the actual 
materiality of the lived body incorporating a lifeless human-made body part.  
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Introduction: Star Athletes and the London 2012 Paralympics 
The 2016 Rio Paralympics created new star athletes, such as the New Zealand sprinter 
Liam Bevan Malone who set new Paralympic records (he broke Pistorius’s world records) in 
winning gold medals in the 200 and 400 meters. The Dutch sprinter, ‘Brade Babe’ Marlou 
van Rhijn was also given a good deal of public attention and won consecutive gold medals 
for the 200 meters in both the 2012 London and 2016 Rio Paralympics. Yet, in terms of the 
public awareness of disabled athletes on the global stage, the London 2012 Paralympics 
proved to be a much more significant turning-point. In fact, the London 2012 Paralympic 
Games had increased significantly the amount of media coverage and attracted the biggest 
ever global audience. The London 2012 Paralympic Games were watched by a cumulative 
global television audience of 3.4 billion (excluding the U.K.), which was a 37 percent 
increase on the successful 2008 Games in Beijing (Brittain and Beacom, 2016).１ 
 
The London 2012 Paralympic was heralded a great success not only by the massive 
increase in public attention, but also by the way it stimulated an intensive discussion about 
the relationship between elite Paralympians and sport technology. While those 
2 
 
Paralympians who suffered from uncontrollable spasticity with cerebral palsy or those who 
had an intellectual disability, were paid less attention in media coverage２, Paralympic stars, 
such as Oscar Pistorius, dubbed ‘Blade Runner’, a double amputee with ‘spectacular 
biomechanical’ carbon fibre prosthetic limbs were given a great deal of media and public 
attention. Although there were previous cases of other disabled athletes competing in both 
the Olympic and Paralympic Games, Pistorius was given unexpected levels of media 
coverage.３ In this context, it is interesting to note that Lauren R. Smith (2015) examined the 
2012 London Olympic and Paralympic media coverage to investigate the choice of 
terminology for disabled athletes. Her research focused on two official broadcasting 
companies, NBC (United States) and Channel 4 (United Kingdom). In her careful analysis of 
the Olympic and Paralympic coverage, Smith (201:404) remarks that while a range of terms 
(pioneer, legend, history maker, poster boy, supercrip) were used in commentary to 
describe Pistorius, the indisputable fact was that no disabled athlete has ever been 
accorded the fanfare and media coverage that surrounded him.４ Given that some 4237 
athletes participated in the London Paralympics (IPC, 2012b), the disproportionate media 
focus on Pistorius was extraordinary. One reason for the media coverage could be the 
controversial narratives surrounding Pistorius. He became the first double amputee to 
compete against able-bodied competitors in the London 2012 Olympic Game. This led to a 
major debate in the public domain about the threat to the established categories between 
disabled and abled bodies, which went to the heart of the Paralympic Games manifesto. The 
debate also problematized eligibility, fairness and the boundary between the human body 
and non-human entities – especially with reference to high-tech prostheses.  
 
This paper focuses on Pistorius, not just because he was a super athlete attracting global 
media attention, but also because he is a fallen hero who is now known as the murderer of 
his girlfriend. This suggests that the narratives around Pistorius reveal a fluid and 
changeable public image of him as a disabled person. This was particularly notable when 
the public saw him without prosthetic legs in the South African courtroom in 2016. Pistorius’s 
human drama went through many twists and turns, shocks and surprises, generating 
considerable public interest and debate which fed well the sensational-seeking appetite of 
the global media. On the one hand, there is the dramatic fall of Pistorius to become a 
convicted criminal, as opposed to a Paralympic star who had conveyed a very positive 
social and political image of the disabled’s role in society. The media coverage of his court 
appeal also created an opportunity for the public to inspect his disabled body without 
prosthetic legs. This was a moment which demistyfied the super athlete prosthetic body. On 
the other hand, his Paralympian cyborg body still evokes new imaginings of the future 
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possibilities of the organic body and created questions about how we could perceive, 
understand, and recognize the ‘new’ disabled body coupled with advanced technology.  
 
The issues of the relation of the human body and technology is now a well-established area 
with body modification and plastic surgery, virtual bodies in digital media, biotechnology, 
robotics, reproductive technology, organ transplantation, genetics and artificial body parts 
which is able to transform or to be substitute organic body (Haraway 1991; Featherstone 
and Burrows 1995; Braidotti and Lykke 1996; Sobchack 2010; Slatman and Widdershoven, 
2010; Shildrick, 2010; Braidotti, 2013; Wilson, 1995; Crawford, 2014a, 2014b).  These 
debates focus on what future human-technological bodies could be and the range of 
socio-cultural implications. These questions are also closely associated with discussions 
about the materiality of human bodies as unstable and unfixed entities. In addition, the term 
posthuman has become central to discussions which have been accompanied by a new 
perception of bodily transformation involving high-tech artificial body parts, such as 
contemporary advanced prosthesis.５  
 
It is common, particularly for disabled athletes to use prostheses in Paralympic events.  
The use of world class high-tech prostheses can be a key factor in winning world-class 
competitions. Accordingly, many high-tech prostheses have been developed: carbon fibre 
feet for footraces, the high-tech wheelchair for basketball, and the high-tech bicycle for 
cycling races etc. The use of technologically advanced assistive devices has changed the 
way sports spectators enjoy watching more spectacular sports and has created a new 
corporeality for Paralympian athletes. The development of high-tech prosthetics seems to 
be changing the nature of prosthesis. The prosthesis is now no longer a simple device which 
can replace a missing part of the body in order to disguise appearance and help physical 
functioning, rather it become part of embodied identity and the visible materiality of the 
disabled. In this respect, the prosthetic body can be defined as a complex entity, which 
encompasses both meanings of the coupling of human flesh with human made devices, and 
the associated images and narratives that challenge the idea of bodily integrity. 
 
This paper focuses on the case of lower-limb prosthesis. This is because the upper and 
lower limbs play an important role as definitive parts that help us identity the human body 
shape. Therefore, visual images of lower-limb prostheses can have a relatively strong 
impact on the overall image of the human body. Advanced lower limb prostheses tend to 
depart from the human shape. Yet when for example they are compared to wheelchairs, 
they can still be perceived as part of the human body, since their shape is often designed to 
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loosely resemble to a human skeletal structure, which is very different from a wheel. As 
exemplary cases, the paper also take up lower-limb prosthesis users, such as Pistorius and 
Aimee Mullins. They have been prominent in media coverage with their appearance 
celebrated as a new positive aestheticization of the human body.６  Unlike high-tech 
wheelchairs, beautifully designed lower-limb prosthesis (see Yamanaka 2012: 101ff) that 
departs from the human form can potentially create ambivalent sensations.  
 
[Shunji Yamanaka’s the below-knee prosthesis ‘Rabbit’,  
Copyright © 2014-2016 Prototyping & Design Laboratory,	Photographed by Yukio Shimizu] 
 
 
 
The aim of this paper is to explore how the contemporary discourse of prosthesis has shifted 
from the made-up and camouflaged body to the empowered and exhibited body, to the 
extent that it is opening up a new social and cultural sensitivity about body image – 
prosthetic aesthetics (Smith, M and Morra, J. 2001).７ I also endeavour to articulate the 
ambivalent emotions and feelings about prosthetic bodies. I would argue that prosthetic 
aesthetics generates two contradictory sensitivities: attractiveness/’coolness’ which can 
derive from the image of a perfect human-machine synthetic body, and abjection/uncanny 
which can be evoked by the actual materiality of the lived body with lifeless body parts. To 
examine these assumptions, it would be useful to first consider the brief history of prosthesis 
and the narratives around human-made body parts. This is followed by an analysis of the 
media discourses of cyborgification in the context of both commercialized Olympic sport 
culture and contemporary art and fashion, to see how far prosthesis narratives have 
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changed. In doing so the paper explores body image not only in the political and 
socio-cultural domains, but also the complex formation process of perceptions, images and 
feelings about ‘new’ bodies’ in the fields of psychology, phenomenology and robotics.  
 
 
The Discourse of Prosthesis 
Before the discussion of the prosthetic as a contemporary concept to analyze the complex 
relationship between technology and the organic body, it would be useful to briefly examine 
the history of prostheses. After the First World War, prosthesis began to be perceived as 
one of the most urgent national project for many countries which had tremendous numbers 
of physically injured and disabled soldiers and civilians during the war. In the German case, 
according to one estimate, limbs were amputated from some 80.000 German Soldiers 
(Neumann 2010:97). The German rehabilitation project provided them with not only financial 
compensation, but also, perhaps more importantly, with rehabilitating them both physically 
and vocationally in order to get them back to become ‘productive citizens’ (Cohen 2001 cited 
in Newmann 2010:97). Before the First World War, most artificial limbs were hand-made. 
They were constructed to closely mimic the human form. Many of the devices were made of 
wood and covered with felt, using celluloid nails to produce a more natural appearance. In 
this sense, the prosthesis was largely expected to camouflage their impaired bodies and 
disguised the disabled body as able-bodied, or ‘normal’. However, the huge demand for 
artificial limbs and the limitations of the hand-made production processes increased the 
criticisms of the cosmetic natural look with its limited functionality. Instead, mass production 
techniques and increased functionality became deemed more important and thus a new 
type of uglier, but cheaper and functionally superior prostheses became made available. 
 
The new type of prosthesis, the functional oriented prosthesis provided not only 
improvements in functionality, in replacing the missing limbs, but also stimulated the 
imagination of future bodies. Let’s take an example from the 1920’s movie, Metropolis 
(1927) directed by Fritz Lang, which provided the first image of a complete artificial body, 
from head to toe, to appear on the cinema screen - a robot. This was a human-made 
techno-body that would never die under harsh conditions, such as warfare, in which the 
vulnerable human body could not survive. Similarly, the prosthetic body, the body with 
human made advanced technological devices, could then stimulate people’s sense of 
psychological uncertainty and curiosity. Hence, the prosthesis was viewed as an element for 
the technological advanced ‘new human body’ – the ‘New Man’ that was developed 
alongside the modern sentiment of techno-fetishism and was expected to be a more 
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efficient and powerful step beyond the organic human body. This fascination with 
techno-fetishism still continues to have a place in the public imagination in contemporary 
society. 
 
 
Paralympic Cyborgs and the Uncertainty of Contemporary ‘New Man’ 
Further improvements in the technology of leg prosthetics have been notable since 1988, 
particularly in the West (Howe 2011:873), with the appearance shifting from human-like leg 
style to non-human, but more machine-like design with the advanced biomechanics. 
Pistorius’s Cheetah prosthetic legs, were developed by a biomedical engineer Van Phillips 
and manufactured by Össur. Images of Pistorius wearing Cheetahs were not only visible in 
sport stadia, but also in newspapers, charity posters, and advertisements for consumer 
commodities. Consequently, the body with high-tech prosthesis draws a good deal of 
attention and curiosity, which is one reason why Pistorius’s media-made futuristic body 
images have caught people’s imagination. In this sense, contemporary sports technology is 
a key factor in expanding the popularity of Pistorius and the approval of Paralympic culture, 
which has increasingly been supported by governmental bodies as well as commercial 
enterprises. The necessity and demand for technology for disabled athletes in the rising 
visible Paralympics also suggests that it could be a useful stimulus to explore the social and 
psychic implications of human-machine synthetic bodies today.  
 
‘Paralympic cyborgs’ (Howe 2011: 869) refers to the Paralympians who have to be 
supported by high-tech devices to compete or play the game. Although the term, cyborg is a 
well-discussed concept and has featured in a wide arrays of academic debates, one of the 
most influential usages of the term is Haraway’s conception of the cyborg as a synthetic 
body coupling with lived flesh and human-made non-organic entities.８ It has been often 
argued that [‘W]hether the machine will take on the characteristics attributed to the human 
body (‘artificial intelligence’, automatons) – or whether the human body will take on the 
characteristics of the machine (the cyborg, bionics, computer prosthesis) remains unclear’ 
(Grosz 1995:110). This idea is that bodies are open systems and are mixed entities with 
connection to others. Hence, our bodies are not singular or ‘molar’ (Deleuze and Guattari 
1980/1998; Rose 2007), but can be understood as multiple and processual. If we can 
understand that the body is always in ‘a process of becoming’ (Shilling 1993:5), 
Paralympian cyborgs can be perceived as a variation of the becoming body which is an 
extended or reinforced new type of living body. Hence, their representations often 
deliberately emphasize futuristic machine-like bodies which were supposed to be the 
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ultimate body which is more perfect, more efficient, and faster than organic human bodies.  
 
This contemporary narrative of the cyborgified body resonates with the German ‘New Man’ 
of the early 20th century. In this sense, the Paralympic cyborg can be seen as a 
contemporary ‘New Man’ - in other words, ‘posthuman’ or ‘transhuman’ (see Boston 2005; 
Twine 2010). Unlike the German ‘New Man’ who was identified as more productive, 
sophisticated and advanced than the human body and thus well-received in post-war 
German society, the discussions around posthuman, did not always welcome the positive 
consequences of technology. The case of Pistorius is no exception here, despite his 
extraordinary sporting records and achievements.９ His performances were under suspicion 
and his prosthetic limbs were viewed as an enhancement device. He was accused of being 
ineligible for competition in line with the policy of the International Association of Athletics 
Federations (IAAF) in 2008.１０ Yet, the Court of Arbitration for Sport (CAS) subverted the 
IAAF’s decision and declared that Pistorius was an eligible athlete, due to their tests results 
which indicated ‘the Cheetas offered no net advantage’ (Cole 2009:3). This event raised the 
danger in that ‘the future of sport itself was imagined as threatened by a post-Pistorius, 
high-tech athletic invasion’ (Cole 2009:3). This suggests that although his prosthetic body 
seems to have become familiarized to the public through the media, his advanced 
prosthesis generates considerable ambivalence and even suspicion. 
 
 
The Visible Prosthesis as Emblem of a New Type of Hero 
While a massive controversy surrounded Pistorius’s legitimacy as an elite athlete, there 
continued to be a stream of positive public representations and images. He was seen as a 
respectable and courageous figure fighting to overcome his tremendous physical 
disadvantage as an athlete who also contributed to charity, education and sport with dignity. 
In the children’s book entitled ‘The London 2012 Games Superstars’, an official London 
Olympic and Paralympic Games publication, Pistorius was introduced as one of the sport 
superstars. In this book, Pistorius remarks, ‘[Y]ou’re not disabled by the disabilities you have, 
you are abled by the abilities you have’. He was celebrated for his restless challenging spirit 
which refused to accept limits in pursuit of higher achievement and for ‘overcoming the 
catastrophe of a damaged body’ (Seymour, 1998:119 cited in Howe 2011:876).  
 
The perfect human-machine synthetic body was always exposed to heroic narratives which 
emphasized the ‘self-made man’ (Foucault 2008; Featherstone 2013) and fits well with the 
current dominant neoliberal ethos. Neoliberalism brought about’ the formation of the type of 
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‘the subject who is an ‘entrepreneur of him/herself’ who is meant to fit into the social 
framework of the “enterprise society”’ (Lazzarato 2009:110). The new type of individual has 
to make an effort to compete with others following the principles of the market. The value of 
life and personhood could depend on whether one becomes a winner or a loser and only the 
self-made man can be successfully identified as a winner. Pistorius’s success story fits well 
in this context and helps sustain his media-made heroic image.１１ His media image was 
advantageous for the International Paralympic Committee which attempted to construct the 
Paralympic Game as a positive social development and referred to the essence of 
Paralympism as enabling ‘Paralympic athletes to achieve sporting excellence and to inspire 
and excite the world’ (IPC 2003:1 cited in Howe, 2008;137).  Hence, Pistorius become a 
respectable figure and although his Cheetahs made him have a less orthodox human-look, 
his body has become an accepted and celebrated body, that can also be seen as a 
fascinating body – as was especially the case during the London Olympics 2012 period. 
Consequently, Oscar’s prostheses, then, became transformed from a simple ‘mobility 
device’ to an important symbol of his heroic endeavour and success, and became integral to 
his very identity.  
 
 
Aestheticized Disabled Body Image 
We can find a similar story about the relationship of the prosthetic body image and identity in 
Aimee Mullins’s intimate relationship with her prosthesis. Aimee Mullins was one of the most 
famous female double amputee Paralympian sprinters.１２ She has also become a world 
renowned actress and model. She appeared in Cremaster 3 (2002), an instalment of 
American artist-filmmaker Matthew Barney’s avant-garde film The Cremaster Cycle. In this 
performance, she said that ‘to be without prosthetic limbs is to be exposed, to be laid bare 
and these prosthetic limbs (even if in nonhuman anthropomorphic form) are an emotional 
crutch as well as a corporeal support’ (Smith 2006:66). The film features her in semi-nude 
aestheticized postures with artificial limbs, or lower limb-replacements constituted to look 
like animals or jellyfish tentacles. This crossing and re-crossing of the boundaries between 
the human, other living entities and things, deliberately disrupts our capacity to see her as a 
human body. At the same time, these refigurings provide her with a strong emotional charge 
that is crucial to her very existence. Hence, her prosthesis has become central to her identity, 
because it extends her bodily boundaries and open and problematizes her sense of identity.  
 
She appeared in a variety of way to represent her body with different designed artificial 
limbs. However, in early stage of her building new identity as a disabled model, the most 
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provocative image of her body could be found in the picture that appeared in the September 
1998 issue of the fashion magazine, Dazed and Confused, guest edited by the fashion 
designer Alexander McQueen and photographed by Nick Knight. She stands with her 
Cheetahs wearing black running shorts, which represents well her identity as a top athlete 
who has a healthy and tough body. At the same time her naked top, well-toned physique 
and her direct ways of gazing at the audience, create not only an image of strength, but also 
a sense of female seductive eroticism. This special issue was entitled ‘Fashion-able’, 
fashion made to face disability. The theme provided the opportunity to consider whether the 
fashion design and industry could use disabled body images as part of their artistic motifs 
and could learn to work together with them.   
 
Her appearance raised many questions as we find in Marquard Smith’s (2006: 58) remark 
that some of the images of Aimee Mullins could trigger sexual fetishist. Although this raises 
many questions both ‘for’ and ‘against’, it is apparent that the public presence of her 
disabled body with non-human-like legs in the fashion magazine can be seen as offering a 
challenge to ‘the traditional cannons of beauty and promotes the idea of diversity’ 
(Vainshtein 2012:150). Thus, Aimee’s aestheticized prosthesis became not only a crucial 
part of her identity, but also a ‘new’ type of beauty.１３  
 
A designer, Graham Pullin (2009: 31) suggests, 
 
   Conventional wisdom is that prostheses should either be made for appearance, 
so-called cosmetic limbs that are an accurate copy of the human body, with optimized 
functionality within this constraint, or for optimized functionality above all other 
considerations, as are tools. But Mullins’s legs show this to be too simplistic. Her legs 
have a beauty of their own, not just as objects, but also in relation to her body and 
posture.  
 
Consequently, People magazine listed her as ‘one of the fifty most beautiful people in the 
world’ (Vainshtein 2012:149). The acceptance of Mullins’s beauty with prostheses brought 
about a new idea of the body and new bodily aesthetic sensibility. In this sense, we can see 
that humanness is no longer a necessity ingredient to be a beauty.１４  
 
 
Uncanny and Prosthetic Bodies 
The aestheticized disabled body with high-tech nonhuman anthropomorphic form prosthesis 
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is perceived differently from the sense of aesthetics which operates in cosmetic prosthesis. 
It would seem that these types of non-human-like prosthesis have become seen as more 
stylish, and to some extent more sophisticated than conventional cosmetic prosthesis. Our 
understanding of these types of complex body images could be furthered by the Japanese 
roboticist Masahiro Mori who proposed an interesting assumption about human perception 
in 1970: ‘uncanny valley theory’, which delineates the tendency for negative emotional 
response and uneasy feelings toward almost exact human-like appearances and 
movements. In this theory, our familiarity increase when we encounter human-like machines, 
however, when human-like machines look and act nearly, but not exactly like a human, this 
subtle imperfection drives our feelings from fondness/familiarity to revulsion/strangeness/the 
uncanny. Hence, he argues that prostheses should deliberately appear as artificial and 
non-human looking to avoid falling into ‘the uncanny valley’. The uncanny is a well-known 
concept developed by Sigmund Freud (1919/2003).１５ Quoting E. Jentsch’s definition of the 
uncanny, Freud explains that the essential condition for the emergence of a sense of the 
uncanny is intellectual uncertainty and it is aroused when we wonder whether something is 
animate or inanimate, and whether the lifeless bears an excessive likeness to the living 
(2003:140). The uncanny can, therefore, be perceived as ‘something to do with death, dead 
bodies, revenants, spirits and ghost’ (2003:140). Our attitude towards the mechanical doll 
(automaton) or mannequin in the show windows can help us unpack this psychological 
reaction towards an object which is clearly not alive, but looks alive. Therefore, it becomes 
unclear whether it is something real or surreal. This strange feeling and the sense of 
uncertainty can resonate with our ambivalent feelings toward the following two 
representations of prosthetic bodies. 
 
Pistorius appeared after 2011 in the advertisements of A*Men by Thierry Mugler Fragrance 
(photographed by Ali Mahdavi), as super-natural looking, wearing shining silver pants and 
metallic cheetah legs in a science fiction futuristic setting (see Figures 2 and 3). His 
representation is intended to create an image of something beyond the human and thus 
‘in-between’ the living human and the lifeless machine. Aimee Mullins was also represented 
as an old Victorian doll, photographed by Nick Knight in 1999 (see Figure 4). She puts on a 
crinoline petticoat (see-through born structure without fabric), a suede shirt designed by 
Alexander McQueen and a fan-shaped short wooden jacket by Givenchy, wearing 
prosthetic legs which have doll-like human shape with dirt stains. Her expression is frozen 
and lifeless and her whole body looks stiff. Her performance as a used and forgotten 
Victorian doll, which is an automaton, helps to present her body a lifeless object. 
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[Figure 2: Oscar Pistorius, A * Men fragrance by Thierry Mugler Fragrance (2011)  
Photographed by Ali Mahdavi] 
 
 
 
 
 
 
[Figure 3: Oscar Pistorius, A * Men fragrance by Thierry Mugler Fragrance (2011)  
Photographed by Ali Mahdavi] 
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 [Figure 4: Aimee Mullin Victorian Doll (1999) Photographed by Nick Night] 
 
 
Both Pistorius’s machine body and Mullins’s doll body create a sense of non-humanness 
and lifelessness, yet at the same time we know they are living humans. Their constructed 
representations as media images are heightened by their missing body parts which were 
replaced by human-made objects. These representations symbolize their in-between status: 
human and non-human, life and death, the future and the past. These contradictions, 
uncertainties and confusions are bound to the sense of the uncanny. Hence, the mixed up 
images of synthetic bodes which conjure ‘in-betweeness’, multiplicity and not-oneness bring 
ambivalent feelings which can instill a sense of shock, strangeness but also a sense of 
curiosity, fascination and attraction.  
 
 
Body Schema and Body Image 
Further insight into this kind of mixed feelings about images of the body can be illuminated 
though debates in psychoanalytical-phenomenology which provides different ways to 
comprehend the relationship between the physical/material body and body images. Schilder 
asserts that the image of the human body is the picture of our own body in our mind and we 
also immediately experience that there is a sense of unity of the body. (Schilder 1950: 11). 
He calls it, following Head (1920), bodily schema and remarks: ‘(t)he body scheme is the 
tri-dimensional image everybody has about himself. We call it ‘body image’ (Shilder 
1950:11). An interesting point to note here is that Schilder used body schema and body 
image interchangeably. Gallagher and Meltzoff rightly identified Schilder’s conceptual 
confusion between body schema and body image: 
 
    We can characterize the body image as involving perceptions, mental representations, 
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    beliefs, and attitudes where the intentional object of such perceptions, beliefs, etc. (that 
    which they are directed towards or that which they are about) is one’s own body. The 
    body schema, in contrast, involves certain motor capacities, abilities, and habits that 
    enable movement and the maintenance of posture (Gallagher and Meltzoff 1996:4). 
 
While they hold a distinction between body image and body schema, these two systems are 
closely connected and highly integrated in a formation process of bodily sensitivity which 
could not only encompass intentional behavior or bodily reactions (e.g. bodily motor), but 
also emotional and sensual bodily reflections. Therefore the body image is comprised of ‘a 
complex set of mental representations of the body’ (Gallagher and Meltzoff 1996:5). In this 
regard, we could use body image to refer to a formation process of emotional reflection with 
corporeal perception.   
 
 
Body Movement and Equilibrium as Transient Steadiness 
Schilder further considers how the body images/scheme refers to not only body movement, 
but also the body image at rest (see Schilder 1950:270). Schilder’s significant insight is that 
he believes that the construction process of body images is far more complex and involves 
not only continuous unstable stages, but also a certain equilibrium moment. 
 
As Weiss (1999:17) elaborates,     
  
That is, the body image has to accommodate a variety of both subtle and dramatic 
changes in the body/situation (hence, its plasticity), without losing its stability. 
Maintaining the stability of the body image is a necessary condition for a sense of 
bodily stability --- the stability of the body image is precisely what provides us with a 
reliable sense of where and how our body is spatially positioned as well as a tacit 
understanding of what our corporeal possibilities are at any given point in time’ (added 
emphases). 
 
Our sense of bodily spatial position can be understood as a proprioceptive awareness which 
contribute to ‘a tacit understanding of what our corporeal possibilities’ are; in other words, 
body schema. This, as Gallagher and Meltzoff (1996:15) define it, ‘involves certain motor 
capacities, abilities, and habits that enable movement and the maintenance of posture’.  
Hence it can be explained that the temporary stability of proprioceptive awareness 
contributes to the construction of transient yet stable body images and is necessity for bodily 
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motor abilities. Following Schilder, Weiss (1999:17) suggests that ‘the belief that the body 
image tends toward a certain equilibrium, but never achieves this equilibrium once and for 
all’. Yet the temporary equilibrium at any given point in time (between a previous body 
image and a new body image) contribute to the possibility of stable bodily coordination 
(movement) and ‘a relatively unified perceptual experience’ (Weiss 1999:18). 
 
Schilder (1950:287) elaborates in more detail on the complexity of bodily equilibrium: 
      
There are tendencies which try to make the body-image complete, but it cannot remain 
so without a renewed effort. There are opposite tendencies as well. There is a tendency 
towards the dissolution of the body-image. When we close our eyes and remain as 
motionless as possible, the body-image tends towards dissolution. The body-image is 
the result of an effort and cannot be completely maintained when the effort ceases. The 
body-image is, to put it in a paradoxical way, never complete structure; it is never static: 
there are always disrupting tendencies.  
 
Schilder’s observation that there could be ‘opposite tendencies’, the dissolution of the body 
image, but also the effort to maintain a certain equilibrium, suggests that we perceive 
moving body images through successive static body images. Schilder further elaborated on 
this aspect, which he sees as changing the process of body scheme (image).  
 
The previous scheme of the postural model remains in the background and upon this 
previous scheme the new scheme is built up. When we move, we depart from the 
comparatively rigid primary picture; it seems in some way loosened and partially 
dissolved till the body returns into one of the primary attitudes. (Schilder 1950:206 - 
207)   
 
He affirmed that although ‘the optical picture’ (Schilder 1950:207) during rapid movement 
tend to be a multiplication and is not seamless, the continuous constructive process 
proceeds from one dissolute image to another. In this regard, the body at rest such as in 
photographs which capture a moment of static body image, can be seen as a moment in the 
dissolution of the body image.  
 
Although these images are selected and edited by photographers so as to often attempt to 
express particular mediated messages and invented narratives, the audience’s reception of 
the photographed body images can of course vary widely. This is because their 
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interpretations of photographs necessarily relate to their own embodied experiences, 
memories, knowledge, desires, hopes and dreams. Yet, as discussed, we cannot ignore the 
influence of the mass media which often tends to utilize a more restricted set of narratives 
and images which seek to guide people’s values and moral assumptions in line with those of 
powerful interests. At the same time, it has often been remarked that contemporary 
consumer culture is an image saturated society and it is often suggested that the increasing 
number of photographs of human body in today’s mediascape, with its magazines, 
advertisements and the Internet, could well be encouraging a new corporeal sensitivities. 
This applies to Pistorius’s and Mullins’s media images, which circulated widely in the global 
media.  
 
 
Morphing and Transforming 
If the photograph can be seen as a static body image, a captured moment in the constant 
dissolution of the body image, we can also find a similar successive process in morphing. In 
her paper on the structure of the digital morph as a novel form of transformation, Vivian 
Sobchack borrows an inspirational phrase, ‘the still point of the turning world’ from the poet 
T.S. Eliot (1943:15-16, cited in Sobchack 2000:157).  She refers to the morphing process 
in Daniel Reeve’s film Obsessive Becoming (1995) in which ‘the movement is indeed 
meta-static: at once in constant transformation from one point to another and yet also 
essentially fixed in time and space’ (2000:143).  For Eliot, ‘at the still point’ which is neither 
arrest nor movement and is not fixed, he sees past and future gathered together. This is the 
transient steadiness, which can be a similar moment to the emerging meta-stasis body 
image. This can be a moment as we move from one dissolute image to another. 
 
Sobchack also explains that ‘morphing as a particular representation of metamorphosis’ 
(2000: xiv-xv) which can evoke a sense of attraction, curiosity and desire. In a similar way, 
Kinder (2000) elaborates that metamorphosis is ‘a trope which is central to creation myths 
from many cultures,’ (63). She continues,   
 
‘[i]t is also a defining formalist feature of dreams and their characteristic tropes of 
condensation and displacement, where the mere temporal or spatial proximity of two 
juxtaposed images can, when narrativized, be read as transformative change – a 
cognitive process that is fundamental to flip books, surrealist jolts, trick films, animation, 
the basic illusion of cinema, and the visual perception of movement’ (Kinder 
2000:63-64). 
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The metamorphosis (the morphing) entails two processes: warping the image into matching 
shape and colours, then gradually cross-dissolving them (see Wolf 2000: 93). What is 
fascination about the morphing is that we can see the whole transition process produced by 
the ‘digital’ computation technologies. The previous image gradually transforms, then at the 
final stage of morphing it becomes totally something different without interruption. This is a 
novel form of configuration, which Sobchack refers to as ‘quick-change’ (2000: xv). 
 
Yet, the transformation process of the elite disabled athlete’s body, such as a picture of 
Pistorius in the changing room is seldom exposed to the public. The audience is generally 
not admitted to back-stage preparation and transformation areas, and rarely able to observe 
the body without prostheses, as it is in the process of being assembled by human hands and 
not mediated by digital image technologies. In terms of the audience’s viewpoint, we 
invariably encounter “front-stage’ images of Pistorius coupled with his prostheses, the result 
of the final stage of the transformative work. Yet Oscar’s body without prosthesis was on 
one dramatic occasion exposed in public. The decision to request Oscar to reveal his 
withered limbs and stumps to the court was an attempt to reveal his ‘real’ vulnerability as a 
disabled man, in order to facilitate an ‘appropriate’ judicial sentence for his Appeal. Here, his 
super athletic body was uncovered to show a vulnerable material human body, which 
resulted in a notable palpable disconnection between the usual and expected ‘before’ and 
‘after’.  
 
In contrast, the computer-graphic digital morphing process can be seen as constituted of 
meta-static points, they all are ‘narativized’ to create an analogical relation between them to 
provide a ‘strangely natural’ (Sobchack 2000:135) continuity between before and after. Thus, 
digital morphing, as Sobchack points out, both turns us ‘backward’ towards mythology and 
magic and the related quick transformations in theatre and trick films; but also ‘outward’ 
towards our current belief in the potential to achieve body “artifice” (e.g. cosmetic surgery, 
which could include prosthesis.) (see Sobchack 2000:xv).  
 
 
Transformation and Mixed Feelings 
The belief in the potential to achieve body artifice can be also analyzed from a 
psychoanalytical viewpoint. In this view, Schilder considers our motives for transforming our 
body. He asserts that in contemporary societies we inevitably modify our own bodies in 
order to resist a stable body image. We can find evidence for this in the ways we decorate 
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our body with clothes, jewelry, cosmetic surgery, tattoos and so on. This motivation for 
transformation can also generate a degree of fascination, pleasure and curiosity to watch 
transformed bodies. He observes that the contortionist’s gymnastic body can be an example 
that illustrates how it evokes a complex sensation for the viewers. 
 
The contortionist pushes to extremes this play with his own body, and the pleasure we 
get out of watching his performance is based upon our wish to break through the 
borderlines of our own body. It is mixed with awe and disgust. We desire the integrity 
and totality of our own body; we are afraid of every change, which may take away a part 
of this body,… but we are still continually experimenting with it (Schilder 1950:206). 
 
He also suggests that a body with an increased number of limbs like Indian gods and 
goddess is part of ‘our delight imagining beings’ (Schilder 1950:206). Hence, our resistance 
to a stable body image always already generates fascination with transformed body images. 
Weiss follows his observation and explains that Schilder considers we have ‘vicarious 
pleasure’ in ‘observing such metamorphosis in others’ who have an exciting/disturbing 
expansion of the body’s physiological capacities (see Weiss 1999:20). Observing others’ 
bodies is also a fundamental incentive for us. When he touched on Freud’s discussion of 
exhibitionism, Schilder argued this is because our desire to be seen is as inborn as the 
desire to see. This is also evidence of the ‘deep community between one’s own body-image 
and the body-image of others --- the body image that should be known to ourselves and to 
others (Schilder 1950:217). Hence, his asserts that ‘the body image is a social phenomenon’ 
(Schilder 1950: 217).１６ 
 
Given that the body image entails continuous mutual interaction with others, we can now 
further consider how confronting a radically transformed body could influence our own body 
image. The radically transformed body can be found in a range of modified bodies, including 
bodies with major cosmetic surgery, body-builders, the tattooed body, anorexic body and 
deformed bodies which transgress socio-cultural normative bodies, including neurological 
disturbance/disordered bodies, amputees, and bodies with prostheses, such as 
Paralympian bodies. 
 
Here we need to consider ‘the vicarious pleasure’ we may gain from observing such 
metamorphoses in others (who are gymnasts)’ (Weiss 1999:19-20). The vicarious pleasure 
can also evoke a mixture feeling of excitement and horror, awe and disgust and fascination 
and abjection. Julia Kristeva argues that abjection ‘disturbs identity, system, order,’ it ‘does 
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not respect borders, positions, rules.’ This is ‘the in-between, the ambiguous, the composite’ 
(1982: 4). Therefore, the abject can be seen as a threat, but at the same time it opens up the 
exploration of a new type of body image. Elizabeth Grosz observes, ‘(A)bjection involves the 
paradoxically necessary but impossible desire to transcend corporeality. It is a refusal of the 
defiling, impure, uncontrollable materiality of the subject’s embodied existence’ (Grosz 
1989:72 cited in Weiss 1999: 90). Hence, abjection continuously threatens to disrupt the 
stability of the body image and ‘haunts’ a unified body image. This is because, as Kristeva 
suggests, we need to know what is not incorporated into the body image in order to know 
what consists of a coherent established body image (see Weiss 1999:89-90). In this way, 
prosthetic bodies challenge our sense of body integrity and stable body image. Therefore, 
they always create psychologically unstable and ambivalent feelings.  
 
Yet, ambivalent feelings, particularly abjection, cannot only be understood in terms of 
psychological analysis, but also are influenced by the dominant social and cultural value 
system.      
 
Kristeva remarks that, 
 
Abjection is coextensive with social and symbolic order, on the individual as well as on 
the collective level. By virtue of this, abjection, just like prohibition of incest, is a 
universal phenomenon; one encounters it as soon as the symbolic and/or social 
dimension of man is constituted and this throughout the course of civilization. But 
abjection assumes specific shapes and different codings according to the various 
“symbolic systems,” (Kristeva 1982:68 cited in Weiss 1999:95) 
 
This view resonates with Butler’s critical point against Schilder’s assertion, that ‘the body 
image is a “social” phenomenon’. Whereas Schilder’s ‘social’ means the inter-relationship 
between one’s own body and the others in terms of a psychoanalytical approach, Kristeva 
and Butler’s emphasis is on the ‘social’, in terms of the field of the political and cultural 
symbolic value system. For Butler (1989) the materiality of the body image could always be 
constituted by normative cultural standards and established symbolic systems (e.g. the 
dominant normative gender image or class distinction). If we follow Butler’s argument about 
body image, we can assume that the coverage of Paralympian’s prosthetic bodies tend to 
represent an attractive spectacular body which is never neutral and is always constructed to 
produce a certain reception and interpretation. This is the way in which Pistorius’ heroic 
body and Mullins’s new form of beautiful body were produced, as discussed earlier. Hence, 
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the Paralympian’s prosthetic body cannot only be understood in its materiality which is the 
very existing entity, but also in its immateriality, which is the imagined/discursive entity with 
an invented assemblage of information, knowledge and narratives.  
 
 
Prosthetic Aesthetics 
On the one hand, in terms of psychoanalytic theory, we can see that a desire to transform 
and resist the stable body image invokes emotional fascination and excitement; at the same 
time, the destabilizing body images threaten the unity of the body and create psychological 
uneasiness, disgust and abjection. On the other hand, in terms of ‘a radical theatrical 
remaking of the body’ (Butler 1994:32), the socially and culturally dominant narratives and a 
well-established symbolic value system, invokes seductive fascination and creates socially 
acceptable or even celebrated bodies. Hence, it is evident that the human body cannot only 
be perceived as a corporeal material and biological entity, but also as the product of the 
discourses and narratives, which are subject to the dominant culture and politics.１７ 
Similarly, the body image cannot only be contextualized by 
psychoanalytical-phenomenological elaboration, but also by the way in which it is bound to 
cultural embodiment, dominant power and invented discourses in society. 
 
Turning now to the issue of the Paralympian body image, it could be ventured that: A good 
deal of narrativised photographic and moving images of Paralympians with technological 
advanced prostheses, such as Pistorius and Mullins, could induce an emotional impulse that 
merges with our normative corporeal perception – the body image. The observation of 
photographic and moving images of a Paralympian’s body-with-prosthesis could also induce 
dramatic changes in proprioceptive awareness and a new sensitivity to the body – prosthetic 
aesthetics.  
 
At this moment, we dissolve the moving body image at any given point in time in order to 
keep bodily equilibrium and try to make a complete/stable body image. Although the 
complete/stable body image is never established, since it continuously changes and always 
is in a process of the formation, this provides a transitional stability for the body image which 
allows us to comprehend a new proprioceptive awareness and to reflect on our own body 
image. The wish to resist a rigid body image is also involved in this process and can provide 
us with a feeling of vicarious pleasure. We are haunted by observing the Paralympians 
body-with-prosthesis which can disturb and threaten our established body image, but at the 
same time we are thrilled by the possibility of breaking through the boundaries of our 
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accustomed body image.  
 
Accordingly, prosthetic aesthetics can generate two contradictory sensitivities: On the one 
hand, it can evoke fascination, attractive and positive sensitivities in the context of 
commercialized Paralympic culture, the promotion of Paralympism, contemporary neoliberal 
society, the nation-state hierarchal competition and increasing global media with 
development of information technologies. On the other hand, it can also stimulate 
excitement in the uncanny, abject and haunted feelings in the context of the challenging 
psychology of human bodily perception. Prosthetic aesthetics then is constantly oscillating 
between fascination and abjection. 
 
 
Conclusion 
The focus of this paper has been on body images, particularly images of the body with 
hi-tech prosthetic devices, which have drawn a good deal of public attention and evoked 
new aesthetic sensitivities towards the human body. The paper has discussed how we could 
attempt to understand, recognize and perceive the ‘new’ disabled body with sophisticated 
sport technology and its design, by drawing on a number of the complex debates across the 
socio-cultural, psychological and phenomenological domains. It has been argued that 
hi-tech prostheses can be viewed as a mixed material, emotional and symbolical entity 
which opens up the opportunity for the exploration of new cultural sensitivities. The 
prosthetic body image can be seen as an unstable product of psychological processes and 
socially constructed discourse.  
 
The paper has endeavored to illustrate the historical discourse of prosthesis and the 
emergence of the ‘New Man’ in order to show the ways in which the meaning and 
significance of prosthetic devices has shifted from trying to mimic the human form in order to 
camouflage, disguise and replace, exhibited symbolic entities which look like machines and 
evoke a sci-fi futuristic multiplicity of human and post-human bodily imaginaries. Taking up 
the case of Oscar Pistorius and Aimee Mullins, a similar tendency can be found in the media 
discourse of Paralympian cyborgs and is also taken up in the performances of contemporary 
art and the fashion industries with their love of the propensity to shock, and problematise the 
distinctions between ordinariness and non-ordinariness. For many people, Oscar and Aimee 
open up new cultural sensibilities for the human body image. This suggests the emergence 
of a new type of body aesthetic sensibility – prosthetic aesthetics. 
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The discussion of Oscar Pistorius’s super-natural looking metallic Cheetah legs for the 
advertisement and Aimee Mullins’s photograph as an old Victorian doll, provided an 
opportunity to examine the uncanny in relation to ‘uncanny valley theory’ and Freud’s 
concept of the uncanny. Focusing on the ambivalent feelings about prosthetic bodies 
drawing on theorizations of abjection, the sense of uncanny, pleasure and fascination, the 
paper draws on the phenomenology of the body, and related psychoanalytical approaches. 
The paper also analyses the invented images of the prosthetic body in the media, drawing 
on approaches from socio-cultural analysis. In the case of Pistorius, this angle is particularly 
important, given that he become a murderer, after his success as an elite disabled athlete. 
In a similar manner to the widespread interest in the Paralympic games, the judicial 
processes of his court case were also widely featured and debated in the international 
media (e.g. ITV ‘Oscar Pistorius: The Interview,’ 24 June 2016). The mass media enjoyed 
Pistorius’s discomfort and the ensuring human drama produced a new impression of him for 
the public. When his body without prosthetic legs appeared in the media, he was exposed to 
be no longer as a super athlete, but no more than a disabled man (see The Guardian 15 
June 2016). Hence, his trajectory alternated between different body images: the fascinating 
heroic body with prosthetic legs and the vulnerable flesh of a criminal body without 
prosthetic.  
 
More to the point, the key question for consideration is the extent to which the socio-cultural 
knowledge, experiences, information and narratives, which includes media discourse (e.g. 
Pistorious heroic image and his vulnerable criminal body or Mullins’s aestheticized 
prosthetic body) plays a key role in creating new cultural sensitivities to the body images, 
and the extent to which the psychoanalytical-phenomenological and socio-cultural analyses 
can also help to re-articulate a complex formation process of emotional reaction and 
corporeal perception which generate ambivalent feelings. In this context, prosthesis could 
be seen to work in two paradoxical ways: it can be an obvious sign of impairment (the 
visibility of disability), but at the same time, it can also conceal one’s image of the disability 
(the invisibility of disability). Pistorius case could be seen as a good example here. When he 
was a successful Paralympian athlete, he was identified and promoted as a great athlete, 
rather than a disabled person in the 2012 Paralympic Game. (e.g. Channel 4 never referred 
to Pistorius as the double amputee and he was always described as ‘a man’. see Smith 
2015; 403). He was the man who could run in the Olympics and the Paralympics. Yet, the 
nature of prosthesis was most palpably revealed, when Pistorius exposed his disabled body 
in the courtroom. This hiding and disguising capacity is inherent in the prosthesis and can 
therefore help to create new images which are often changeable and unstable. 
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The paper has sought to explore the above debate in order to better understand the 
ambivalent feelings of both fascination and disgust, the prosthetic synthetic body can 
generate. It should also be emphasized that these paradoxical emotional responses toward 
the prosthetic body never become polarized. This is because the body image necessarily 
remerges to fit or adjust to new experiences, information and knowledge and thus memories 
and perceptions of the body image are often revised and reinterpreted. This is why aesthetic 
sensibilities are always challenged by the ever-shifting context of the lived world.  
 
Hence, the body image is never stable (although there can be some temporary stability to 
maintain a temporary equilibrium), as it can be understood as a mirror or projection of our 
desire and fear, excitement and disgust, fascination and the uncanny. All these impulses are 
continuously destroyed and re-constructed in the environments we are experiencing in the 
lived society. In this sense, as Schilder argues, we can possess an infinite number of body 
images, since there is a never-ending of change body perception and body schema in the 
constitution process of body images. Thus he concludes ‘every body contains in itself a 
phantom (perhaps body itself is a phantom)’ (Schilder 1950:297).１８ 
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１Furthermore, London 2012 was the first truly social media and online Games. Throughout the 
course of the Games there were 1.3 million tweets mentioning 'Paralympic', 25 million people 
visited the London 2012.com website and over 5.8 million people downloaded the London 2012 
Paralympic App. In addition, ‘nearly 2 million people visited www.paralympic.org - which 
broadcast over 780 hours of live action. There were more than 5.1 million downloads of videos 
on-demand during the Games from the official IPC YouTube channel, 
www.youtube.com/paralympicsporttv`’ (IPC, 2012b). 
２ It should also be added that we should not forget there are still many disabled people who 
are not able to access high-tech prosthesis and still suffering from discrimination in the context of 
everyday life. Paralympians are indeed exclusive in many ways. The technological 
empowerment of the disabled body can increase the gap between those who can take 
advantage of technological developments and those who cannot – in this sense, the celebration 
of the cyborgification of the disabled athlete can only work to create further hierarchal status 
differences within the disabled community. 
３ It is hard to find official records for the number of disabled athletes who competed in the 
Paralympics and Olympics, but it seems that there were at least eleven disabled athletes 
who competed in both games (see Wired magazine, 2012). 
４ Smith’s article provides an exhaustive analysis of the complete NBC and Channel 4 
footage of the London 2012 Olympics and Paralympics. The data analysis of the various 
words and phrases used to describe disabled athletes in live race coverage plus live and 
pre-recorded interviews, shows that an unexpectedly high proportion of commentary was 
solely focused on Pistorius. 
５ The meaning of prosthesis can cover the broader sense of adding something. In the early 
stage of medicine, prosthesis refers to ‘an artificial device used to replace a missing body 
part, such as a limb or a heart valve’. The origin of prosthesis can be found in the 16th century 
Late Latin and Greek term taken up in the 16th century, prostithenai, which means ‘addition’. 
(Dictionary.com. Collins English Dictionary - Complete & Unabridged 10th Edition. HarperCollins 
Publishers. http://dictionary.reference.com/browse/prosthetic) (accessed: August 23, 2015). 
６ Japanese industrial designer, Shunji Yamanaka developed highly sophisticated carbon fibre 
prosthetic lower-limbs for Paralympian athletes. He was deeply inspired by observing Pistorius in 
the Beijing Paralympics and become dedicated to develop a carbon fibre prosthesis as an 
aesthetic product which is un-like the human leg, but is able to evoke a sense of beauty. See 
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Yamanaka (2012: 8 onward).  
７ The term, ‘the prosthetic aesthetic’ was coined for the special issue entitled ‘The 
Prosthetic Aesthetic’, New Formations 46 (2001). The term encompasses the editors’ 
approach of questioning prosthesis (in general) in relation to aesthetics (in particular).  
The issues examine ‘the confluence of the body, technology and prosthetics in an aesthetic 
and visual form’ (Smith and Morra 2001:5) and so covers issues includes ‘consciousness, 
compositing, the organic versus the machinic, the post-human, autobiography, indexicality, 
desire, the Other, the phenomenon of the phantom limb, deficiency, puppetry and gestation’ 
(Smith and Morra 2001:5) in visual culture. Yet, in this paper, the term is employed in a more 
specific way to refer to a new cultural sensitivity of prosthetic body image, which evokes two 
contradictory sensitivities. 
８ One of the early indications of cyborgs was suggested by Manfred Clynes and Nathan Kline in 
“Cyborgs and Space” (1960) and intensively discussed and suggested by Donna Haraway in 
Simians, Cyborgs, and Women: The Reinvention of nature (Haraway 1991).  
９ He produced a series of extraordinary sporting records: 2004 Athens Paralympic Games, 
200m, 2008 Beijing Paralympic Game, 100m, 200m, and 400m.  
１０ The International Association of Athletic Federations determined that Pistorius was ineligible 
for competition based on the policy which prohibits ‘any technical device that incorporates 
springs, wheels or any other elements that provides the user with an advantage over another 
athlete not using such a device’ (cited in Cole 2009:3). 
１１ Braidotti argues that ‘advanced capitalism is spinning machine that actively produces 
differences for sake of commodification’ and ‘it is a multiplier of deterritorialization differences, 
which are packaged and marketed under the labels of “new, dynamic and negotiable 
identities”’(Braidotti, 2013: 58). Before the tragic incident, his media constructed ‘super hero’ 
image was used in sports marketing and more importantly, as a representative of his nation, 
South Africa. This is because, his body is deterritorialized to be not just commodified in 
commercialized Paralympic culture, but also ‘nationalized’ in the hierarchal competition of the 
nations.  
１２ She run with her prosthetic legs designed by Van Phillips and made a Paralympic records in 
1996 (Vainshtein 2012:149).  
１３ Aimee has twelve pairs of prosthetic legs, including Cheetah legs, highly decorative legs, 
and natural looking legs with hair follicles and freckles (see Vainshtein 2012:152). She chooses 
a pair of legs depending on the clothes she wants to wear, or on particular occasion. For her, 
prosthetics legs are ‘a functional device as well as fashion accessories’ (Vainshtein 2012:154). 
１４ The prosthetic aesthetic is not only found in the body image of the cyborg athletes in the 
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Paralympic Games, but also in other fields of the public: in contemporary art, performance art 
(dancers) and the fashion business (Debenams ads & fashion shows). For example, Mario Gala 
who is a one-leg male model with a prosthetic limb appeared at Michalsky’s show in 2010. His 
prosthetic leg instantly drew attention from the public and attracted people ‘as a result, 
Michalsky’s collection became the hit of the fashion week’ (Vainshtein 2012:161).  
１５ Freud investigated the semantic content of the German word unheimlich and its 
etymologicall connection to English word, unhomely. Unhomely is ‘whatever it is about persons 
and things, sense impressions, experiences and situations, that evokes in us a sense of the 
uncanny and then go on to infer its hidden nature from what all these have in common’. He also 
explained that ‘the uncanny is that species of the frightening that goes back to what was once 
well know and had long been familiar’ (1919/2003:124). He continued the factor which creates 
the uncanny is ‘unintended repetition’ in particular ‘something that has been repressed and now 
returns’ (2003: 147).  
１６ Interestingly, this flexible and ever-changing body image could also be made sense of via the 
discovery of the brain’s plasticity in neuroscience. This opens up the possibilities of 
re-constructing or re-mapping the body image through mutual exchange between our own body 
image and that of others. This notion of plasticity is one of the strongest and most influential 
concepts in neuroscience today and describes ‘the brain as at once an unprecedented dynamic, 
structure and organization’ (Malabou 2008: 4). Similarly, Schilder also recognizes that there is 
multi-referential relationship between perception of our own body and that of the other. He states 
that ‘the difficulty in the perception of our own body precedes the difficulty in the perception of the 
bodies of others’ (Schilder 1950 : 44) and that this points to ‘the principle of the connection 
between body-images’ (Schilder 1950:48).  
１７ We can also see this view in history. There is evidence of a socially constructed 
understanding of disability ‘as opposite to a well-established aesthetic/functional norm, 
which is linked with industrialization, the development of natural science, and the growing of 
statistics as a political device in late 18th and 19th century.’ (see Silva and Howe, 2012:177). 
１８ The term phantom used here does not attempt to capture the widely discussed debates 
such as those revolving around phantom pain or a phantom limb, which have been 
developed in a variety of disciplinary and interdisciplinary ways by neuroscientists, 
sociologists, psychologists and phenomenologists; rather, it is used to attempt to 
encompass, the variability of what Schilder claims to be, ‘the phantom character of one’s 
own body’ (Schilder 1950:297).   
